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CTRUST: A Dynamic Trust Model for 
Collaborative Applications in the Internet of 
Things 
Anuoluwapo A. Adewuyi, Hui Cheng, Qi Shi, Jiannong Cao, Áine MacDermott, and Xingwei Wang 
Abstract— Security through trust presents a viable solution for threat management in the Internet of Things (IoT). Currently, a 
well-defined trust management framework for collaborative applications on the IoT platform does not exist. In order to estimate 
reliably the trust values of nodes within a system, the trust should be measured by suitable parameters that are based on the 
nodes’ functional properties in the application context. Existing models do not clearly outline the parametrisation of trust. Also, 
trust decay is inadequately modelled in most current models. In addition, trust recommendations are usually inaccurately 
weighted with respect to previous trust, thereby increasing the effect of bad recommendations. A new model, CTRUST, is 
proposed to resolve these shortcomings. In CTRUST, trust is accurately parametrised while recommendations are evaluated 
through belief functions. The effects of trust decay and maturity on the trust evaluation process were studied. Each trust 
component is neatly modelled by appropriate mathematical functions. CTRUST was implemented in a collaborative download 
application and its performance was evaluated based on the utility derived and its trust accuracy, convergence and resiliency. 
The results indicate that IoT collaborative applications based on CTRUST gain a significant improvement in performance, in 
terms of efficiency and security. 
Index Terms— Collaborative computing, Distributed applications, Internet of Things, Security and Privacy Protection, Trust 
management  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
HE Internet of Things (IoT) vision is fast becoming a 
reality and extensive research work is being carried out 
across the entire IoT spectrum to resolve any key chal-
lenges that remain [1]–[3]. IoT aims at enabling objects in the 
physical world to be able to communicate with the digital or 
cyber world, thus bridging the gap between the two. For this 
to occur, the objects must be “smart”. Each smart object has 
a unique identifier and some basic computing capabilities, 
such as processing, networking and service discovery [4]. 
These objects are then able to ‘talk’ to one another through 
some communication protocols and connect to another de-
vice on the Internet. The IoT vision is built upon other re-
search areas such as cyber-physical systems (CPS), wireless 
sensor networks (WSNs), big data, machine learning, adhoc 
networks, mobile computing and ubiquitous computing.  
The realisation of the IoT vision implicitly requires col-
laborations and interoperability between various devices 
and networks on a massive scale. Information security 
management is, therefore, of critical importance and more 
complex to manage. The heterogeneous and pervasive na-
ture of IoT creates a larger threat landscape than ever be-
fore [5]. Also, due to the different IoT technologies being 
used, and the fact that most IoT devices have limited com-
puting power, employ a distributed architecture and use 
less conventional networking methods, traditional security 
management used in the current Internet cannot be di-
rectly applied here [5], [6]. New security countermeasures 
are required that are lightweight, intelligent and operable 
in real-time [5]–[7]. While this remains an ongoing research 
challenge, an interesting candidate solution is security 
through trust. 
Trust is an important component of computer security 
[8]. Given that the IoT consists of services and devices pro-
vided by different actors who may be unknown to end us-
ers, the necessity of trust evaluation is higher than it is in 
the traditional Internet [5], [9]. Users need to be sure that 
the services offered to them will provide the highest utility. 
Collaborating peers need to be sure of the identities of the 
peers they interact with. There is also a need to avoid or 
mitigate the myriad of security risks inherent in the IoT 
paradigm. The difficulty in finding universal security so-
lutions for the IoT means that trust becomes, perhaps, the 
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most important security metric and a measure of how se-
cure the interaction of an IoT entity with another is. In fact, 
it has been posited that trust management is wider in scope 
than traditional security management [7]. While tradi-
tional security aims to actively keep the realisation of risks 
at a minimum, trust management in IoT strives to identify 
nodes that are reliable and are perceived to be unlikely to 
pose any unacceptable risks and restrict relationships to in-
clude only such nodes.  
The need for reliable trust management is appreciated 
more in collaborative applications. In collaborative IoT ap-
plications, several users or devices come together and pool 
their resources to execute a task or provide a service. The 
resources could be bandwidth, network routes and access, 
processing power or storage space. The motive behind the 
collaboration could be an increase in the speed of the task 
execution, as is the case in the collaborative download of a 
file. It could also serve to achieve redundancy and there-
fore increase reliability, as is the case in collaborative stor-
age, routing and streaming applications. These are a few 
examples of use cases where a collaboration is beneficial. 
Most of these collaborations will be formed “on the go”; 
that is, the collaborating peers will be unknown to each 
other. This introduces even more security risks to the col-
laborating peers, such as privacy or data loss and creates 
entry points for other security attacks. The introduction of 
the notion of trust among peers is one way to minimise 
these threats [5], [7], [10]. 
Trust is an essential and common social concept but dif-
ficult to define. This is so because it is abstract and multi-
faceted. It is also either purely or mostly subjective, and its 
meaning depends on the context in which it is used [11], 
[12]. Several definitions of trust exist in the literature. Even 
though there is no agreed definition in literature, a large 
volume of research on trust shows it is a very important 
concept [5]. For example, a ‘trusting intention’ is given in 
[11] as “the extent to which one party is willing to depend 
on the other party in a given situation with a feeling of rel-
ative security, even though negative consequences are pos-
sible”. This definition correctly identifies trust as a decision 
taken by the trustor. Another issue is that several definitions 
of trust do not provide measurable indices that may be used 
to evaluate trust. The concept of computational trust is, thus, 
introduced. Computational trust is the adaptation of the so-
cial notion of trust to the digital world, so that it can be rep-
resented and evaluated by mathematical models [9]. 
A trust management system (TMS) provides methods 
and mechanisms to evaluate the trustworthiness of inter-
acting peers, based on a trust model. The trust model de-
termines how trust is computed in a specific context. Sev-
eral TMSs have been proposed and widely studied in liter-
ature. However, there is little work done on the manage-
ment of trust in IoT contexts [7], [13]–[15]. Many of these 
models focus mainly or only on trust recommendations 
and aggregation. Little or no account is taken of other as-
pects of trust management, such as trust decay, trust pa-
rameter selection and the weighting of trust parameters. In 
addition, they mainly consider the social interaction 
among nodes. Hence trust is derived almost entirely from 
recommendations. However, given that collaborative ap-
plications are task-based systems, the trust score of a trus-
tee node should indicate the degree to which a trustor be-
lieves that the trustee is both competent and willing to ex-
ecute required tasks reliably. 
Trust parameters should be based on the contextual 
functional properties that determine whether a service 
provider is reliable and provides good service. This notion 
of a functional trust model that is weighted by subjective 
beliefs and recommendations of the trustor guides the ap-
proach to trust modelling in this paper and agrees with the 
trust definition given in [16].  The temporal characteristic 
of trust should be recognized: past or stored trust values 
must decay with time and be replaced by newer assess-
ments; this process should be modelled by an appropriate 
decay function. Recommendations from other nodes are 
necessary as they can be aggregated to make an informed 
trust decision on a node with which there have been no 
previous interactions. However, they may be abused to 
perform good-mouthing or bad-mouthing attacks. There-
fore, the trust model should also include a belief function 
that guides the acceptance and usage of trust recommen-
dations from other nodes. 
In summary, there is a need for a well-defined trust 
model for such IoT applications, where the trust score is a 
performance metric based on functional properties rele-
vant to the collaboration context. This paper aims to ad-
dress these research gaps and provide a holistic approach 
to trust. To achieve this, we consider and model each of the 
individual components of a TMS required to reliably esti-
mate trust. Based on these, a trust model is designed and 
evaluated in a collaboration context. Our model makes the 
following contributions: 
1. We use weighted trust parameters (criteria) that can be 
specified at runtime to adapt the model to different 
contexts. This means that trust parameters, in contrast 
to recommendations, form the basic building block for 
trust computation. In most trust models in literature, 
the trust computation is built almost entirely on recom-
mendations. This approach does not consider trust as 
a performance metric, and thus weakens the trustor’s 
decision to trust. In our model, nodes decide the func-
tional parameters required to assess trust satisfactorily, 
along with their relative importance. 
2. We consider trust degradation as a distinct component 
of the trust computation that is solely based on time. 
Previous trust models use parameters to weight past 
trust to current experience. This is done recursively with 
every new interaction and therefore does not consider 
the time that has elapsed since a previous trust assess-
ment was made. To resolve this, our model includes a 
trust decay function with a dynamic component to ac-
commodate different degrees of nodes’ willingness to 
trust. This ensures trust degrades in a consistent manner. 
3. We implement an improved recommendation function 
with the addition of a belief degree. Other trust models 
only consider the recommender’s trust scores in accepting 
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recommendation. We identified other criteria that deter-
mine the degree to which a recommendation is accepted 
in social contexts and combined them to model the belief 
degree, which we then use to weight recommendations. 
4. We introduce a parameter to model trust maturity or equi-
librium between two nodes, the point at which trust can 
be computed using direct interactions alone. This implies 
that it is possible to determine trusted nodes solely by em-
pirical methods, which is a novel contribution. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a comprehensive overview of the state of the art re-
garding trust modelling in IoT, including research gaps 
and a justification for a well-defined model, that we call 
CTRUST. Section 3 specifies and analyses the CTRUST 
model design. In Section 4, we implement the model to 
guide node selection in a chosen collaborative context, pre-
sent the simulation results and evaluate the performance 
of the model. In Section 5, we compare our model to others 
in literature to show its distinction and significance in the 
field of study. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and 
highlights possible future work. 
2 BACKGROUND 
The concept of trust modelling and management in IoT is 
a rapidly evolving research area. It is therefore important 
to enumerate the desirable properties of an ideal trust 
management system for IoT, which we do in Section 2.1. 
These properties were elicited primarily from survey pa-
pers that review existing work and discuss challenges with 
current trust models in IoT.  In Section 2.2, we show that 
the current IoT trust models do not satisfy all the trust 
properties enumerated in Section 2.1. We show that the 
same holds true for traditional trust models in Section 2.3, 
and hence establish their unsuitability for use in IoT. As a 
result, we prove the necessity of a new trust model and pro-
vide a justification for the model presented in this paper. 
2.1 Ideal IoT-Centric Trust Model 
A system model and a holistic trust management frame-
work are given in [7]. The overall objective is to ensure that 
trust models provide an acceptable level of and balanced ap-
proach to the security, functionality and usability of the IoT 
applications wherein they are utilised. The appropriate de-
sign of a trust management system is critical, therefore, and 
is the focus of this paper. The set of desirable properties for 
a suitable TMS for collaborative IoT applications must now 
be enumerated , based on work done in [7], [14], [17], [18]: 
1. Platform consideration: Devices on the IoT platform 
would typically have low computing power. Also, they 
would be distributed and operate in a decentralised 
network architecture. Therefore, the mechanisms used 
for the TMS must be lightweight, scalable and essen-
tially decentralised.  
2. Trust as a Decision (TaaD): Trust should be modelled as 
a decision-making process with the objective and sub-
jective trust properties of the trustor taken into consid-
eration. Each trustor should be able to decide the im-
portance of a trust criterion or recommendation. Dif-
ferent trust values may be computed by different trus-
tors for the same peer to reflect the trustors’ different 
subjective trust dispositions. 
3. Trust Composition: The TMS should incorporate the nec-
essary objective (quality of service, QoS) and subjective 
(social) properties of the trustee as trust parameters, so 
that the trustor can make a well-informed trust decision. 
4. Trust Persistence: Trust is persistent and cumulative in 
nature. Hence, the TMS must provide a means of stor-
ing trust values effectively, taking into consideration 
the low storage capability of IoT devices. 
5. Trust Decay: Trust is temporal in nature. Stored or previous 
trust values degrade gracefully over time. The TMS 
should include a trust decay function to guide this process. 
6. Risk Mitigation: It should provide effective mitigation 
of self-promotion, good-mouthing, ballot-stuffing, op-
portunistic service and on-off attacks, as described in 
[19]. The inclusion of a robust recommendation and be-
lief function in the TMS would make it difficult for 
nodes to profit from malicious activities. 
7. Trust Accuracy: This is a measure of how close the trust 
value computed for a node is to the ground trust. The 
ground trust for a node is the trust value that we would 
compute if we had perfect knowledge of its behaviour. 
The TMS must have a high degree of trust accuracy.  
8. Trust Convergence: This is a measure of how long it 
takes for the trust value computed for a node to reach 
its ground trust and maintain it, given a consistency in 
the behaviour of the node. The TMS should ensure 
trust converges quickly. 
9. Trust Resilience: This is a measure of the ability of the 
TMS to adapt to changes in the trust community, such 
as an increase in the ratio of malicious peers to good 
peers. The trust values computed by the TMS should 
remain accurate and quickly converge to new ground 
truth values in these situations. 
 
Fig. 1. Core components of a TMS and their interactions. This repre-
sentation is based on the definition given in Section 2.1. 
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These properties, along with their importance, will be dis-
cussed in Section 3. The basic components of a TMS are il-
lustrated in Fig. 1. Each component and its interaction with 
others will also be discussed in Section 3. 
 
2.2 Existing IoT-Centric Trust Models 
The peer-to-peer (P2P) nature of collaborative IoT applica-
tions means that there is no central authority. Modelling 
and evaluating trust in such contexts is usually difficult 
[10]. Collaborating peers will often be strangers to one an-
other, having no shared history between them. Centralised 
TMSs should therefore not be considered in a collaborative 
IoT context. While a centralised approach to trust manage-
ment is chosen in [13], the use of multiple trust manage-
ment servers in different geographical locations is as-
sumed. This means that all nodes must be registered under 
one of these servers and that the servers themselves are 
owned by a single entity. It does not take into consideration 
of collaborative applications that may be performed without 
access to the Internet. Indeed, the work focuses on service 
provisioning rather than collaborative situations, and only 
proposes a framework for different services without speci-
fying solutions for individual contexts. 
The concept of social IoT trust is utilised in [14], [15], [19], 
where it is argued that existing social relationships between 
owners must be taken into account in trust management. 
This usually involves sharing some private information, 
such as user identities, locations and other relationships. 
This opens the door to personal, malicious attacks from bad 
peers. While trust is a human concept, it also depends on 
the context in which it is used. In the IoT context, the trust 
is between the interacting nodes, which may sometimes by 
required to exchange some information for identification 
and trust computation. However, this should be done in a 
transparent and non-intrusive manner that maintains the 
privacy of non-relevant information [7]. 
In [20], a trust management model for IoT based on 
fuzzy reputation is proposed. However, the model is spe-
cific to WSNs and only evaluates objective properties of 
packet forwarding/delivery ratios and energy consump-
tions [13], [19]. Thus, the model cannot be applied to col-
laborative IoT scenarios without some extensions. Further-
more, it neither properly models trust as a decision of the 
trustor nor considers the subjective properties of the trus-
tee. The trust model in [21] is designed specifically for 
health IoT systems and cannot be applied to collaborative 
IoT contexts. 
Boa and Chen proposed a dynamic TMS, and extended 
it to trust-based service composition in IoT [19], [22]. The 
work considers three parameters to derive a trust value: 
honesty, cooperativeness as a service provider, and the 
community-interest of the nodes. The model includes a 
weighting factor to determine the relative importance of 
recommendations based on the trust level of node provid-
ing the recommendation. This factor can be dynamically 
increased to improve the resilience of the system with re-
spect to the proportion of good peers and malicious peers. 
This however subjects the system to opportunistic service 
and on-off attacks [18], where a malicious node can provide 
good service but bad recommendations about other nodes. 
This is a consequence of evaluating a node’s trust score en-
tirely on the subjective opinions of some other nodes, as 
will be shown in the next subsection. 
There is also the need to consider the temporal nature of 
trust. It is usually useful to store trust scores from past inter-
actions and utilize them in making trust decisions in the fu-
ture, thereby building a trust history. This idea is widely em-
ployed in trust models to aggregate trust values over time. 
However, as is the case with recommendations, this notion 
may be abused by malicious nodes. If trust is to be a reliable 
assessment of the performance of nodes on functional prop-
erties, then it is necessary to track the behavior of the nodes 
with respect to such properties and to detect and respond to 
changes over time. There is, therefore, the need for a trust 
decay function such that previous trust values degrade 
gracefully over time. This is also required to prevent on-off 
and opportunistic service attacks. In most existing trust 
models, however, trust decay is not considered. 
Boa and Chen extended their previous work to service 
oriented architecture (SOA) based IoT systems and service 
management in social IoT in [14] and [15] respectively. The 
new model focuses on social trust based on the parameters 
of friendship, social contact and community of interests. 
This model is not feasible for use in collaborative IoT con-
texts, as previously argued. Moreover, as it is based on [19] 
and [22], it inherits the limitations of subjective opinions 
discussed above. The nomadic, adhoc nature of IoT collab-
orations implies that collaborators may have no previous 
transactions with one another. In these cases, the use of a 
TMS solely based on reputation, such as EigenTrust [23] or 
PeerTrust [24], is not a good solution for several reasons, 
as will be discussed in the next subsection. 
2.3 Traditional Reputation Models in IoT 
Contexts 
While reputation is an integral part of trust, the two are not 
equivalent. The reputation of a person or device usually de-
pends on the subjective views of others. In a largely decen-
tralised architecture such as collaborative IoT, there is no 
standard way to determine whether the present reputation 
score of the device was not bought or given by a group of 
malicious peers. Since there may be no central database to 
keep track of reputation ratings, it is not always feasible to 
find out which peer contributed a ranking to the present 
overall score. A reputation-based system works in large 
P2P networks and e-commerce applications such as eBay 
because there is a centralised trust authority and database 
[10]. This makes it possible to track the consistency of the 
rankings of every peer in the system. 
It can also be seen that reputation-based trust systems, 
such as [25], are entirely based on the trustors’ subjective 
opinions which tend to be reinforced through an inherent 
feedback mechanism. This works well in large networks 
due to the “wisdom of the crowd” [26]. It is highly likely 
that the opinions of 1000 people about a seller on eBay will 
be a true reflection of the seller’s activities. In a collaborative 
IoT scenario, however, the number of peers involved is 
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small. The opinions of such a small number of rankers can 
be easily influenced and may not truly represent a trustee’s 
trustworthiness. The feedback mechanism can cause multi-
ple counting of the same behaviour, leading to aggravated 
rewards or punishments. Therefore, reputation should not 
be used alone for trust computation in such contexts. 
The use of entirely subjective opinions of others to deter-
mine trust scores presents yet another problem in a collabo-
rative IoT scenario. Take a collaborative download applica-
tion as an example. Each possible helper peer may advertise 
the price charged per bandwidth used. A peer may receive 
a low ranking solely based on a higher price. This does not 
consider (and may not be a true reflection of) the helper 
peer’s objective qualities in estimating its trustworthiness. 
The higher price may be a consequence of faster and better 
service offered. When this level of service is needed, the pre-
vious ranking will affect the trust score of the helper peer 
and may prevent another peer from patronising its service. 
Traditional reputation systems mitigate this issue by 
providing some feedback on rankings. This is achieved by 
eliciting reviews or by providing categorical scores along-
side an overall trust score. This provides additional insights 
to the trustor and leads to a better trust decision. However, 
such a level of detail may not be feasible in IoT environ-
ments due to the limited computing requirements. 
In [27], a recommender system is enhanced by adding a 
trust layer. However, the method assumes prior friendship 
between nodes and therefore only considers social trust 
parameters. Lastly, because reputation based TMSs use 
recommendations, they make the collaborative sphere 
more vulnerable to bad-mouthing and good-mouthing at-
tacks [19]. This introduces an unnecessary bias into the 
trust model. It also corroborates the authors’ argument 
against the assessment of trust solely on subjective opin-
ions in a collaborative IoT context. 
In summary, most existing trust models in IoT are primar-
ily based on recommendations, with the inherent risks as 
highlighted above. In contrast, our proposed trust model em-
phasises the parametrisation of trust. The trust parameters are 
based on the functional properties of nodes which are rele-
vant to the application context. Recommendations are only 
used initially to augment the trustor’s assessment. In addi-
tion, the process of trust decay is clearly and adequately mod-
elled, which is an improvement upon existing models. Our 
trust model is discussed in detail in the next section. 
3 CTRUST MODEL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
We now propose CTRUST as a suitable trust model to eval-
uate and manage trust between nodes in collaborative ap-
plications in IoT. The trust a node has in another is based 
on its assessment of their current and past direct interac-
tions and the recommendations it accepts from other 
nodes. Trust criteria form the basis on which assessments 
are made, and a trustor determines the weights of each cri-
terion. A node can then compute trust scores which it uses 
to choose which other nodes to collaborate with. Trust 
scores are stored and are used to guide future interactions, 
although their importance declines over time. The model 
consists of trust assessment, decay recommendation and 
aggregation functions, all of which are discussed in detail 
in subsequent subsections. A high-level workflow of the 
model is illustrated in Fig. 2. The following gives an over-
view of CTRUST: 
1. Trust would be composed of one or more trust criteria 
(parameters) relevant to a collaborating context. Each 
trust parameter could be objective (QoS) or subjective 
(social) in terms of assessment. An assessment of a 
node on a parameter is called a partial trust score. 
2. A trustor would be able to assign weights to each trust 
parameter. The weights indicate the relative importance 
of each parameter to the trustor. Therefore, partial trust 
scores are weighted before trust aggregation. 
3. Trust would be propagated in a distributed manner, 
with no intervening central authority. Each node stores 
its previously computed trust values and may accept 
trust recommendations on partial trust scored from 
other nodes. 
4. A recommendation function is implemented to guide the 
degree of acceptance of trust recommendations on partial 
trust scores. We call this degree of acceptance belief change, 
and it is modelled based on social characteristics. 
5. Trust scores decay over time based on a mathematically 
modelled trust decay function. We also define the points 
at which previous trust is taken to have decayed com-
pletely and when current trust has reached maturity. 
6. A trust aggregation function determines how partial 
trusts are aggregated to compute an overall trust score 
for a node. The aggregation function chosen depends 
on the collaboration context. In this paper, we use a dy-
namic weighted sum method. Trust updates (on partial 
trust scores) are event-driven and occur whenever 
nodes interact with one another. 
We now proceed to define the trust model in detail. Let 
C be the set of all possible collaborating nodes under the 
current application or collaboration context. T[C], the trust 
space over C, is then a sextuple expressed by the following 
 
Fig. 2. Flow diagram illustrating the basic steps involved in trust com-
putation in the CTRUST model. 
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notation: ܶ[ܥ] ≡ [ ௜ܶ௝ , �, ௜ܹ , ௜ܸ௝ , ܨ, ݐଵଶሺ݅ሻ] ∀݅, ݆ א ܥ ሺͳሻ 
Where ௜ܶ௝ is the trust score of node j as computed by node i; � = {�௜ , �ଶ, �ଷ, . . . , �௡} is the set of trust parameters or prop-
erties on which each node in C is assessed by other nodes; ௜ܹ = {ݓ௜ሺ�ଵሻ, ݓ௜ሺ�ଶሻ, ݓ௜ሺ�ଷሻ, . . . , ݓ௜ሺ�௡ሻ}  is the set of 
weights on each parameter in P, as assigned by i; ௜ܸ௝ = { ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ଵሻ, ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ଶሻ, ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ଷሻ, . . . , ௜ܸ௝ሺ�௡ሻ} is the set of values 
denoting node i’s assessment (partial trust score) of j on 
each parameter � א �; ܨ = ݂ሺܹ,ܸሻ ≡ ௜ܶ௝ is the trust aggregation function; and ݐభమሺ݅ሻ is the half-life of any partial trust score computed by i. 
3.1 Trust Parameters 
Our design follows a multi-criteria approach towards trust 
computation. A trustor makes a trust decision based on 
multiple criteria. Each criterion is a trust parameter. Pa-
rameters could either be objective or subjective. Parame-
ters are considered objective if they are verifiably meas-
ured. Such properties include the speed of a transaction, 
reliability, rate of work, proximity, cost of a service, stake 
in the collaboration, etc. If p is an objective parameter, then 
for a node ݆ א ܥ, ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ�  is approximately the same if 
measured by any ݅ א ܥ at instant t. Subjective parameters 
such as honesty, cooperativeness or friendliness are as-
sessed as perceived by the trustor. Therefore ሺ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻሻ� does 
not have the same value from all ݅ א ܥ, even if they all as-
sessed j at the same instant, t. Therefore, the trust model sup-
ports both QoS and social trust parameters, which means a 
greater robustness and latitude of applications. 
We do not explicitly specify the trust parameters in our 
model. This is because the choice of which parameters to 
use depends on the collaboration context and should be 
decided when C is set up. Suppose a service composition 
with n collaboration contexts,ܥଵ…ܥ௡  is set up, one ap-
proach will be to populate the set P with all possible pa-
rameters for all the contexts wherein the trust model will 
be implemented. Then the weights of parameters which 
are not relevant to the current context can be set to 0. 
3.2 Parameter Weights 
The weights determine how important a parameter is rela-
tive to the overall trust score. Each node determines the 
weight of each parameter, based on their current subjective 
opinions. As a result, two nodes may have an equivalent 
value set, V, at a given instant, yet compute different trust 
scores, T, for a third node. The weights are assigned such that: ݓ௜ሺ�ሻ א [Ͳ,ͳ]∀݅ א ܥ, � א � and ∑ ௜ܹ = ͳ ሺʹሻ 
Even though set P is the same for every node in C, a 
node can eliminate parameters that it does not want to con-
sider by assigning them a weight of 0. The weights can be 
dynamically adjusted by the trustor at any time during a 
session of interactions. Nodes can update their record of 
set W at any time, according to changes in their perceptions 
of relative importance of each parameter. The dynamic 
weighting allows for more accurate modelling of human 
trust. The relative importance of the factors that determine 
the extent to which a person trusts another can vary greatly 
over time. Similarly, the relative importance of collaboration 
criteria can vary for each node from one session to another. 
3.3 Partial Trust Scores and Aggregation 
The set ௜ܸ௝  represents the normalised assessment of node j, 
by node i, on each of the trust parameters in P. The collab-
oration context defines the parameters, i.e. how they are 
measured and on what scale. Objective parameters such as 
rate of work or network speed are well defined and will be 
measured uniformly across C, while the measurement 
scale for subjective ones such as friendliness may differ 
from node to node. Each member of ௜ܸ௝  is a partial trust 
score as they determine the overall trust score, ௜ܶ௝. The val-
ues are normalised to [0, 1] so that ௜ܶ௝  is also within the 
same range, and the normalisation method must be de-
fined in C. 
Three factors account for any ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻ at the current time: 
its previous value based on past interactions; the current, 
direct assessment of j by i; and indirect assessment of j by 
some other node k. These will be discussed in detail later. 
The trust aggregation function, F, specifies how the partial 
trust scores are aggregated to compute ௜ܶ௝ . In this paper, we 
use a weighted sum function, ܨ = ܹ × ܸ. Therefore, 
௜ܶ௝ =∑ݓ௜ሺ��ሻ௡�=ଵ × ௜ܸ௝ሺ��ሻ∀݅, ݆ א ܥ, �� א � ሺ͵ሻ 
It can be observed that the derivation of this function 
incorporates objective and subjective properties of both the 
trustor and trustee. Furthermore, our trust model allows 
for the aggregation function to be left unspecified until the 
collaboration context is set up, which is expressed as ܨ =݂ሺܹ,ܸሻ. This is important because the context should de-
termine the method by which partial trust scores are ag-
gregated. Some contexts may require a product of weighted 
scores, or a more complex function such as Bayesian infer-
ence or regression analysis, to compute a trust value [28], 
[29]. Therefore, it is best to leave the aggregation function 
unspecified until the context is set up, as this makes the 
model robust and applicable to more contexts. 
3.4 Trust Decay 
It is necessary to model the impact, over time, of previous 
trust scores on the current trust values; this is achieved by 
introducing the concept of trust decay. The trust score, ௜ܶ௝, 
gradually degrades over time when there is no interaction 
between i and j. In the social world, the longer we are fur-
ther away from a person, the easier it is to distrust that per-
son. This is so because we are not sure whether they still 
retain the values for which we admired them. Interactions 
help to re-evaluate our opinions of them on these values, 
and serve to reinforce the trust relationship, or score. Ac-
curately modelling trust decay is very difficult, and there 
is limited existing literature on the subject. The following 
assumptions seem to hold true in the usual social context, 
and form the basis for the trust decay function of our 
model: 
1. As the trust formation depends on partial trust values 
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on each trust component, trust decay applies to these 
values and not the overall trust score, which may not 
correlate with the trust decay rate. The reason for this 
is that in the interval between interactions, the trustor’s 
perception of the relative importance of some of the 
trust parameters may have changed. 
2. The rate of trust decay is almost entirely subjective. It 
depends on the trustor’s willingness to trust and the 
length of time or number of interactions the trustor re-
quires to establish a node’s behaviour in the present. 
3. It is reasonable to assume that trust decays at an expo-
nential rate in the absence of interactions [30]. The 
longer the period of inactivity between the peers, the 
greater the rate of decay. 
4. When a new session of interactions is made in the pre-
sent time, previous trust decays with every new inter-
action. This is so because the new interactions tend to 
form the trustor’s new opinions and therefore, trust 
score of the trustee. After a certain number of new in-
teractions, past trust values may no longer be relevant 
to trust computation in the present. 
The above assumptions provide the basis by which trust 
decay is incorporated into our model. Let ݐభమሺ݅ሻ be the du-
ration required for a partial trust score assigned by i to de-
cay to half of its initial value, i.e. its half-life. The decay 
function follows an exponential trend and is represented 
by the following mathematical equations: ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴→� = ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴ × ͳʹ ��భమሺ௜ሻ≡ ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴ × ݁−ఒ೔�≡ (�݅)ݐ  × ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴ ∀݅, ݆ א ܥ, � א �
ሺͶሻ 
ߣ௜ = ln ʹݐଵଶሺ݅ሻ ≈ Ͳ.͸ͻ͵ݐଵଶሺ݅ሻ ሺͷሻ (�݅)ݐ = ݁−ఒ೔� ሺ͸ሻ 
Where ሺ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻሻ଴ is a partial trust score at the end of the last session 
of interactions between i and j;  ሺ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻሻ଴→� is the current value of ሺ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻሻ଴ after time t of 
no interactions between i and j;  ߣ௜  is the decay constant for partial trust scores from i; and ሺ�௜ሻ� is the trust decay multiplier for node i. 
The multiplier is the proportion of the partial trust score 
that has not decayed after time, t, of no interaction. Equa-
tion (4) can then be simplified and rewritten as: ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴→� = ሺ�௜ሻ� × ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴ ∀݅, ݆ א ܥ, � א �  
After an adequate number of interactions in a new ses-
sion, the effective proportion of ሺ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻሻ଴ that determines ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻ in the current session becomes 0, according to As-
sumption (4) above. At this point, the trust has attained 
maturity in that session. Trust maturity is discussed fur-
ther in Section 3.6. 
3.5 Trust Recommendations and the Belief 
Function 
There may be times when node i is about to start a new 
session of interactions with node j, and it is currently in a 
session with another node k, which has some assessment 
on j. Node i may make use of this assessment to make an ini-
tial update of j’s partial trust scores prior to initiating interac-
tions. This is called an indirect assessment, or a recommenda-
tion, on j by i, through k. The drawbacks of trust systems 
solely based on reputation or recommendations (see Section 
2.3), must be avoided. A recommendation belief function is 
therefore required to determine the degree to which any node 
i accepts k’s recommendations on j. The following premises 
should be taken into consideration in order to model the belief 
function accurately: 
1. The purpose of recommendations is usually to guide i 
as it attempts to initiate or re-initiate interactions with 
j. They either make the trustor initially more sceptical 
or more open to trusting j. After interactions are made, 
k’s indirect recommendations are quickly discarded, as 
i’s direct assessment forms the basis of the trust score. 
2. Recommendations do not necessarily affect i’s trust re-
lations with k, even if they are proven to be incorrect. 
K might have been misinformed. It follows then, that 
the best way to prevent good and bad-mouthing at-
tacks is to minimise the effect of indirect recommenda-
tions on a partial trust score, and hence, ௜ܶ௝. 
3. Let the change between k’s current recommendation 
and i’s previous partial trust score of j on some param-
eter be ȟܸ . The smaller the absolute proportion of 
change, | Δ�ሺ�೔ೕሺ௣ሻሻబ |, the easier it is for i to accept. This 
stems from the observation that in a social context, we 
are less likely to receive a recommendation about a per-
son if the recommendation represents a significant dif-
ference from previously observed behaviour. 
4. The longer the time t that has passed since the last ses-
sion of interactions between i and j, the more open i 
will be in accepting k’s recommendation. This is be-
cause of trust decay; the longer the time t, the smaller 
the proportion, �௜, of previous trust left. The value of 
trust is a function of time; the extent to which we 
would believe a value that implies a significant change 
in a person’s behavior depends on the time that has 
elapsed since our last interaction with them. 
5. The greater the value of ௜ܶ௞, or more specifically ௜ܸ௞ሺ�ሻ, 
the more likely we are to receive the recommendation 
of k on j on some trust parameter, p. In a social context, 
we more readily believe recommendations on a subject 
from someone who we rate high on the same subject. 
The belief function can be then derived mathematically from 
premises (3) – (5) above: 
Belief, �௜௝←௞ ∝ ቌͳ − | ௞ܸ௝ሺ�ሻ − ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴ |ቍ�௜௝←௞ ∝ ሺͳ − �௜ሻ�௜௝←௞ ∝ ௜ܸ௞ሺ�ሻ ሺ͹ሻ 
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⇒ �௜௝←௞ =�ቌͳ − | ௞ܸ௝ሺ�ሻ − ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴ |ቍ × ሺͳ − �௜ሻ × ௜ܸ௞ሺ�ሻ ሺͺሻ 
Where K is a constant. The value of K does not need to 
be verified. Since the change belief is a relative indicator of 
how much a recommendation is to be accepted, the exact 
value of K need not be known. Therefore, we set K = 1 so 
that at the beginning of a new session of interactions be-
tween i and j: �௜௝←௞ = ቆͳ − |�ೖೕሺ௣ሻ−ቀ�೔ೕሺ௣ሻቁబቀ�೔ೕሺ௣ሻቁబ |ቇ × ሺͳ − �௜ሻ × ௜ܸ௞ሺ�ሻ ሺͻሻ  
This belief function indicates how much node i is will-
ing to accept a recommendation on j from k, i.e. the weight 
i assigns to that recommendation. It therefore determines 
i’s indirect assessment of j through k, on parameter p, Ψ௜௝←௞ሺ�ሻ,which is given by: Ψ௜௝←௞ሺ�ሻ = �௜௝←௞ × ௞ܸ௝ሺ�ሻ, ݆ ≠ ݇ ሺͳͲሻ 
A node cannot provide recommendations on itself. This 
comprehensively defends against self-promotion attacks. 
Once new interactions begin between i and j, then accord-
ing to premise (1) above, �௜௝←௞ = Ͳ. This renders any good-
mouthing or ballot-stuffing attacks by k useless. Together 
with the trust decay function, it also provides an effective 
defence against opportunistic or on-off attacks by k. This is 
so because i does not accept recommendations on nodes it 
is currently interacting with. Also, a node performing ran-
dom attacks simply degrades the partial trust score it re-
ceives from i. Thus, a malicious node stands very little 
chance to gain by providing a bad recommendation or ser-
vice to i, and its ability to impact ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻ is severly limited. 
3.6 Trust Update and Maturity 
Let ܦ௜௝ሺ�ሻ be i’s direct assessment of j on trust parameter p 
in the current session of interactions. The method of as-
sessing ܦ௜௝ሺ�ሻ depends on the parameter. It could be a rate 
of work done, which can be computed simply based on ob-
servation. It could also be a co-location score, for which a 
formula needs to be applied. Generally, the method for eval-
uationg direct assessments must be specified for each pa-
rameter when designing the collaboration context. 
To update trust reliably, the concept of trust maturity 
must now be introduced. In addition to direct assessments, 
previous trust scores and recommendations impact the 
current value of any partial trust score, and we have de-
scribed trust decay and recommendation belief functions 
for these. There should be a point in time at which direct 
assessments are sufficient to compute trust scores. Let Γ be 
the number of interactions required to reliably measure ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻ based on ܦ௜௝ሺ�ሻ only. After Γ interactions between 
two nodes in any session, the trust score computed by one 
on the other attains maturity or equilibrium. In other 
words, trust maturity is a state that is attained in a collab-
orative session when direct assessments of the interactions 
between any two nodes are sufficient for either node to ac-
curately assess the other’s trust scores. At this point, past 
trust between the nodes is assumed to have decayed com-
pletely and recommendations are not considered in com-
puting the trust scores of either node. 
The value of Γ depends on the collaboration context, C, 
and must be determined by initial experiments. Once this 
value has been determined, it can be used in future ses-
sions to weight previous trust scores. For example, after Ζ 
interactions between i and j in a new session, the effective 
proportion of a previous trust score, ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴, is given by: ߤ௜ = max ቆ(ͳ − �Ȟ) × ሺ�௜ሻ� , Ͳቇ ሺͳͳሻ 
In other words, once  � ≥ Ȟ, ߤ௜ = Ͳ in accordance with 
Assumption (4) in section 3.4. At the start of a new session 
of interactions between i and j, the initial value of ܦ௜௝ሺ�ሻ =Ͳ.ͷ. This is the midpoint between complete distrust (0) and 
perfect trust (1). It is taken as the neutral trust value in the 
absence of any information. It is also the default assess-
ment value that is used for computing trust scores for a 
node with which i has had no previous interactions. 
We have now discussed all the three factors needed to 
compute ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻ at current time, ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ�. Let ܩ ⊆ ܥ be the 
set of nodes currently in a collaboration session with node 
i. Suppose there are s number of nodes in G, ܩሺͳሻ…ܩሺݏሻ, 
that have a recommendation on j, then: 
TABLE 1 
LIST OF MODEL PROPERTIES 
 
Symbol Description Type ܶ݅ ݆  Trust value of j as computed by i, at the current 
instance and context 
Derived � A trust metric or parameter by which trust is 
assessed in the current context 
Design ݓ݅ሺ�ሻ The importance of p as determined by i Input ܦ݆݅ (�) The direct assessment score of j, as measured or 
perceived by i, on parameter p 
Derived ቀܸ݆݅ ሺ�ሻቁݐ  The trust score of j, as determined by i, on parameter p, at time t Derived ቀܸ݆݅ ሺ�ሻቁ
0
 
The trust score of j, as determined by i, on 
parameter p, at the end of the last session 
Derived ሺ�݅ሻݐ  weight of ቀܸ݆݅ ሺ�ሻቁ
0
in next session of interactions 
after time t of no interactions between i and j 
Input 
ቀܸ݆݅ ሺ�ሻቁ
0→ݐThe real value of ቀܸ݆݅ ሺ�ሻቁ0 that determines ቀܸ݆݅ ሺ�ሻቁݐ  at time t, in the current session Derived ߤ݅  Best defined as ቀܸ݆݅ ሺ�ሻቁ
0→ݐ  / ቀܸ݆݅ ሺ�ሻቁ0 Derived �݆݅←݇  The proportion of a recommendation on j, from k, 
that i is willing to accept 
Derived Ψ݆݅ ←݇ሺ�ሻ The indirect assessment score of j on parameter p, 
as received by i from k, based on �݆݅ ←݇  Derived 
Γ Number of interactions in a session required to 
reliably measure trust by direct assessment only 
Design 
N[C] Number of all nodes in the collaboration context 
and community, C 
Input 
N[G] Number of nodes in C that are actively in 
collaboration with i at the current instance 
Input 
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We have defined all the properties required to setup the 
CTRUST model. A brief description of each property is given 
in Table 1 for easy reference. Fig. 2, as noted earlier, is a basic 
illustration of the trust computation process in CTRUST 
which has been discussed in the preceding subsections. 
We have seen that CTRUST supports multiple QoS and 
social parameters. While CTRUST allows the aggregation 
function to be specified according to the context, we used 
a dynamic weighted sum in this paper. Also, trust recom-
mendations in CTRUST are propagated in a distributed 
and decentralised manner. In this section, we have shown 
that the trust update mode is event-based; i.e. trust scores 
are updated after every interaction. In [18] and [28], trust 
computation models are classified according to their trust 
composition, propagation, aggregation, update and for-
mation. Using that classification scheme and notation, 
CTRUST is a QoS + Social / Distributed / Dynamic 
weighted sum / Event / Multi-Trust with dynamic 
weighted sum. We evaluate the performance of the model 
in the next section. 
4 MODEL PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION 
For evaluation, the trust model was implemented in a col-
laborative download application. The aim here is to meas-
ure the performance of the model in a real-word collabora-
tive context, in terms of the trust properties of trust accu-
racy, convergence and resilience. In turn, this will prove 
the effectiveness of the trust composition, persistence, de-
cay and risk mitigation methods applied in the model, as 
discussed in the previous section. The trust properties of 
platform consideration (IoT) and trust as a decision (TaaD) 
are implicit in the model’s design. Thus, we prove that 
CTRUST satisfies all the trust properties of a suitable TMS 
for IoT as enumerated in Section 2.1. 
In the following subsection, the experimental collabora-
tion setup is introduced and explained. In Section 4.2, the 
trust parameters are defined, and initialization values are 
provided for other model parameters as required. The ac-
tual evaluation is discussed in Sections 4.3 to 4.5. 
4.1 Context Overview: Collaborative 
Downloading 
The concept of collaborative downloading (CD) has been 
addressed in previous works [31]–[33]. Collaborative 
downloading is a peer-to-peer (P2P) paradigm where the 
bandwidth of multiple devices is pooled to download a re-
source. Usually, a peer requiring a resource requests that 
the other collaborating peers assist to download the re-
source using their Internet connection and bandwidth, as 
illustrated in Fig. 3. This is especially useful where the 
peers or nodes are nomadic, and individual mobile band-
width is small relative to the resource to be downloaded. 
One scenario is where the content to be downloaded is 
commonly requested by the collaborating peers. Rather 
than downloading the resource individually, they can col-
laborate so that each peer downloads partitioned data 
ranges of the resource. These partitions can then be aggre-
gated and delivered to each peer.  
Another scenario is in places where there is limited or 
no Wi-Fi, ADSL or other broadband, and the only available 
Internet connectivity is the more expensive and/or slower 
mobile 2/3/4 G network. Peers may collaborate to save 
money and time in such cases. Access to a resource server 
or WSN sink is also optimised using this technique. Rather 
than making multiple connections to the same server (or 
sink in WSN) for the same data ranges, each peer down-
loads a different data range at a time, thus optimising the 
server or sink uplink. 
In a CD system, nodes available to help with a down-
load send out broadcasts of their availability. These broad-
casts are seen by all other nodes in the same geographic 
vicinity. These nodes form the set C. A node wishing to in-
itiate a download (we call this node the initiator) will pick 
collaborators from this set of nodes using some selection 
algorithm. The selected nodes form the set G. The initiator 
sends out the URL of the resource (workload) to be down-
loaded to these nodes. The workload is divided into blocks. 
Each block is a range of bytes of the workload. The blocks 
are distributed among each node in G using some work 
schedule algorithm. The nodes transfer the completed 
blocks by uploading the byte range downloaded as a file 
object to initiating device over the wireless communication 
channel. Therefore, CD application could be thought of as 
a distributed download manager. When all the blocks have 
been downloaded, the file objects are combined to retrieve 
the original resource. 
4.2 Collaboration Context Setup 
We identified three criteria to judge the suitability of a 
node as a collaborator in the CD context described above: 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of a collaborative download session. Collaborators 
download byte ranges of the requested resource and transfer back to 
the initiator using a WLAN connection e.g. Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. 
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its download speed, reliability in successfully completing 
workloads and the level of security risk it poses to the col-
laboration. Based on these criteria, we now define the fol-
lowing three trust parameters to evaluate the CTRUST 
model in this collaboration context: 
1. Successful Completion Rate (SCR): This is a measure of 
the reliability of a collaborating node. It is based on the 
number of times, in the current session, that a node has 
successfully both downloaded and transferred a work 
queue block back to the initiating node. In a new ses-
sion of collaboration, the direct assessment ܦ௜௝ሺܵܥܴሻ 
begins at 0.5. The initiating node keeps a cumulative 
count of the total number of both assigned and success-
ful blocks in the current session. 
2. Cumulative Bandwidth Average (CBA): This is a meas-
ure of the work speed of the collaborating node. It is 
determined by the average bandwidth of a node, as 
measured by the initiator. It is cumulative over the cur-
rent session of interactions. The initiating node keeps a 
running total of the total number of bytes and time 
taken, for each collaborating node in the current ses-
sion. The CBA is then normalised. At the beginning of 
a new session of interactions the default value of ܦ௜௝ሺܥܤܣ௡௢�௠ሻ = Ͳ.ͷ is used. 
3. Inverse Risk Index (IRI): A malicious collaborating 
node may modify blocks before sending them to the 
initiator. It may even just send a block of the expected 
size, with all bytes set to 0 or 1. It may also try to dis-
rupt the CD session, by ignoring the work queue order, 
for example. The introduction of a parameter to assess 
the nodes’ malicious intent is required to keep would-
be malicious nodes in check. Whenever some tamper-
ing or fraud is discovered, either in a block marked as 
complete or in the work queue, the initiator marks that 
block (or whatever block the malicious node is cur-
rently downloading) as a bad block and updates ܦ௜௝ሺܵܥܴሻ to reflect the risk that the node poses. IRI is 
cumulative over a session. As usual, the initial value of ܦ௜௝ሺ�ܴ�ሻ at the beginning of a new collaboration session 
is 0.5. 
These parameters were considered by the researchers to be 
the most important functional parameters in a collabora-
tive download context. For any context, a decision must be 
made to determine which functional requirements may 
serve as trust parameters. This is an initial step in setting 
up the collaboration context without which the trust model 
cannot be implemented. 
We now proceed to compute ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ�  as follows. If 
there has been no previous interaction between i and j, and 
there are no recommendations on j from any of the other 
collaborating nodes, then ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ� = ቀܦ௜௝ሺ�ሻቁ�. At the end 
of a session of interactions (which is one download ses-
sion), the final computed value for ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ�  becomes ቀ ௜ܸ௝ሺ�ሻቁ଴for the next collaboration session. Indirect assess-
ments are handled as described in section 3.5. Once the in-
itiator has set the weights for each parameter, ௜ܶ௝  can be 
computed as described in section 3.3. The results of the 
simulation are discussed below. 
We set up the collaboration community with size, �[ܥ] = ͳͲ  per session. Also, the maximum number of 
nodes the initiator i collaborates with at any time, �[ܩ] =ͷ, except where it is necessary to increase the group size to 
illustrate a point. An example of such case is the speedup 
illustration in Fig. 4. In this experiment, we assumed that 
the subjective utility function of the initiator is linear and 
that all parameters are of equal importance. Therefore, we 
used an equal weight for all the parameters, i.e. ݓଵ = ݓଶ =ݓଷ = ଵଷ. In each simulation, there were 60 download ses-
sions of interactions. The default trust value is 0.5. In simu-
lating the behaviour of nodes with respect to the parame-
ters, nodes are randomly set up such that they tend to com-
plete anywhere between 50-100% of the blocks assigned to 
them. The same goes for block tampering or risk. A random 
average bandwidth between 0.5B to 1B is assigned to each 
node. The performance of the model is discussed in the fol-
lowing subsections. 
4.3 Utility of the Model in Collaboration Context 
The aim of the collaboration is to increase the download 
speed of a resource. Fig. 4 illustrates the speedup achieved. 
To understand the effect of the computing and time over-
head expended on node selection, we run two different 
modes of CTRUST. In the first, the initiator utilises the 
nodes selected at the beginning of a session until the end. 
In the second, after a trust update of a node, the initiator 
decides whether to continue with that node, or to check [C] 
for another known node with a higher trust score. Trust 
update is triggered by the event of change to the status of 
a block; that is, whenever a block is returned to the initia-
tor. This second mode is an adaptive mode, which we call 
CTRUST-A. For comparison, we run another simulation 
with the same group of nodes but selected randomly. In 
this experiment N[C] = 10, that is the maximum number of 
nodes available for collaboration. 
 
Fig. 4. Plot of Speed-up against different group sizes, N[G]. The figure 
shows the download speed-up achieved using either modes of 
CTRUST for node selection compared to a random selection of nodes. 
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We observe that even when the utilization level is up to 
70% of the nodes in such a small community (i.e. N[G] = 7), 
there is still a significant improvement in the speedup 
achieved when nodes are selected based on the trust model 
as opposed to randomly. Beyond this point, i.e. if 
N[C]/N[G] > 0.7, then the initiator has limited ability to dis-
criminate based on its preferences, since it can reject only 
30% or less of the available nodes regardless of their trust 
scores. As a result, the impact of the trust model on speedup 
rapidly decreases. When N[G] =N[C], no selection takes 
place since all the nodes in the collaboration community are 
being utilised for downloading. Thus, there is no difference 
in speedup when N[G] = 10, as can be seen in Fig. 4.  
The speedup achieved is comparable to the results that 
were obtained in [31], with the added advantage of trust. 
We observe that even with the extra computation in-
volved, CTRUST and CTRUST-A outperform the random 
selection in speedup. A two-tailed test also shows a signif-
icant difference in the overall average speed obtained per 
session between random selection and CTRUST, as shown 
in Table 2. Hence, we conclude that incorporating the trust 
model into the CD protocol does not negatively impact on 
the performance of the protocol. The difference in speedup 
over the course of a session between the two modes of C-
Trust is statistically insignificant. However, CTRUST-A 
computes fresh trust scores after each interaction. There-
fore, this mode is more sensitive and adaptive to changes 
in node behaviour within a session. This adaptability, 
known as trust resilience, is a desired property and is eval-
uated below. For this reason, CTRUST-A is the default 
mode used in our experiments. 
4.4 Evaluating Trust Model Accuracy and 
Convergence 
We now compare the trust scores obtained by the model to 
the ground truth status, and how long it takes to converge 
to ground truth status. The ground truth status is obtained 
by computing what the trust score should be based on the 
randomly assigned nodal characteristics. It is the truth 
value that would be assigned to the node if the trustor had 
perfect knowledge of its behaviour. This comparison is im-
portant because it shows the effectiveness of the model in 
accurately estimating trustworthiness of nodes in a reason-
able time. The results obtained are presented in Fig. 5-7.  
The results show that the trust value of the node being 
assessed converges to the ground truth status after about 
250-300 interactions. This number, though seemingly high, 
is to be expected. This collaboration context requires a 
short time-frame for each interaction. Therefore, a rela-
tively high number of interactions would be required to 
accurately compute trust values. Also, the fluctuations that 
TABLE 2 
LIST OF MODEL PROPERTIES 
 
 
Fig. 5. Convergence of SCR to ground truth. 
 
Fig. 6. Convergence of IRI to ground truth. 
 









Observations 60 60 60 
P value at 
(α=0.05) 
1.27E-17 3.77E-23 0.0516 (lowest 
value obtained) 
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can be observed are to be expected because the behaviour 
of a node may be perceived differently due to environmen-
tal or external factors. However, it should be noted that if 
the node characteristic remains the same, the trust value 
will converge back to the ground truth. 
The large dip in Fig. 7 after initial convergence is due to 
the sensitivity of the parameter (IRI) to slight changes in 
assessment. This is a property of this collaboration context. 
Unlike in [19], where the trust value is tracked over 100 
hours, the results here show the trust value over the inter-
actions in one session. This is more logical in our opinion, 
as trust scores are a function of interactions over time. For 
comparison, however, the usual duration of one session is 
about 2 hours. 
4.5 Evaluating Trust Model Resilience 
Resilience is the ability of the model to adapt to changes in 
the collaboration community and maintain a high effi-
ciency under such circumstances. The three major factors 
affecting this are bad recommendations from other nodes, 
change in node behaviour, and increase in the proportion 
of malicious nodes in the collaboration community. By de-
sign, bad recommendations have very little effect on 
CTRUST, as explained in Section 3.5. Recommendations 
are only used at the beginning of a new session of interac-
tions with a node. A bad recommendation will show only 
as a minor initial fluctuation on the graph. The adaptive 
mode of CTRUST ensures this. Therefore, this is not dis-
cussed further. 
CTRUST adapts to change in a node’s behaviour both 
within a session and between sessions. The former has 
been illustrated in the previous subsection. The results 
show that any nodes can reliably assess one another with-
out the necessity of recommendations after about 250 di-
rect interactions between them. Thus, trust maturity is 
reached after 250 interactions, i.e. Ȟ = ʹͷͲ. Fig. 8-10 illus-
trate the resilience of CTRUST to changes in node behav-
iour across two sessions, using the same node as in the pre-
vious simulations. The second session begins with the 470th 
interaction, at which point �௜ = Ͳ.ͺ. For comparison, there 
are two plots for each parameter; one with the trust decay 
function described in section 3.4, and the other without it. 
The results show that without the trust decay function, 
it takes much longer to start to converge and it may never 
reach the new ground truth status. With the trust decay 
function however, the new ground truth is reached after 
about 250 interactions, thus keeping the trust maturity in-
dex, Ȟ, constant in the collaboration context. This proves 
the effectiveness of the trust decay function. 
In Fig. 8, an early dip in the curve is noticeable. This is 
due to the nature of the parameter being assessed and the 
behaviour of the node being assessed. CBA is a cumulative 
measure of reliability. Therefore, if a node achieves little in 
initially completing workloads, then it requires a steeper 
curve to reach ground truth status afterwards. The ground 
truth value for CBA, in this case, was 0.82. The assessed 
value dropped to 0.68 due to some failed blocks in the sim-
ulation. The dynamic update method in CTRUST-A im-
plies that trust scores are updated after every interaction. 
This accounts for the variations that can be seen in Fig. 8-
10. In the non-adaptive mode of CTRUST, the variations 
 
Fig. 8. Resilience of CTRUST to change in CBA. 
 
Fig. 9. Resilience of CTRUST to change in SCR. 
 
Fig. 10. Resilience of CTRUST to change in IRI. 
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would balance out over the course of a session of interac-
tions. The dynamic mode is preferred, however, because 
changes in the behaviour of collaborating nodes are con-
tinuously tracked and this makes it easier to spot malicious 
behaviour or a sudden drop in service level.  
The initiator can define a minimum expected level of 
speedup to address the problem of suspected increase in 
the proportion of malicious nodes in the community, espe-
cially when the derived utility (speedup) suddenly drops 
significantly. The initiator can also alter the relative 
weights of the parameters to achieve its desired service 
level. For instance, if there are a lot of failed blocks, the 
weight of SCR may be increased by 20%. The same rule ap-
plies to every other parameter. If after two iterations the 
service level is not met, then the initiator may never 
achieve its minimum utility. The initiator should terminate 
the collaboration at this point because its objective cannot 
be achieved. 
5 RELATED WORK 
A survey of trust models in the existing literature has al-
ready been reported in Section 2. In this section, we present 
a comparative analysis of our work to the previous work 
done in trust management for IoT applications. We do this 
to show the importance and distinction of our work, and 
the contributions it makes to this field of study. 
A detailed trust model for social IoT systems is pre-
sented in [15]. However, the model lacks a distinct trust 
decay function. Instead, two parameters are introduced; 
one weights past experiences versus direct assessments 
and the other weights recommendations versus past expe-
riences. This introduces several problems in the trust com-
putation problem. First, every direct assessment that is fol-
lowed by a recommendation reduces the importance of 
past trust because it is weighted twice in both interactions. 
This does not allow for graceful degradation of trust. 
Moreover, if the trustor receives several consecutive rec-
ommendations on the same node, the impact of the past 
trust score and the trustor’s direct assessment on that node 
rapidly declines with each recommendation. This is the 
case even if the trustor’s direct assessment were made 
about the same time as the recommendation. Thus, mali-
cious nodes can come together to influence the trust rating 
of one node with another node. Also, the model does not 
consider the time value of trust in that the recommenda-
tion made, even if genuine, could be based on an interac-
tion farther time than the trustor’s last direct assessment of 
the node on which a recommendation is being received. In 
our model, we have separate recommendation and trust de-
cay functions, each of which takes the temporal nature of 
trust into consideration. The recommendation function ag-
gregates multiple recommendations received around the 
same time on the same node into a group recommendation 
score. Finally, we combine weighted values of direct assess-
ments, past trust scores and group recommendations to 
compute present trust scores. This ensures that trust scores 
are weighted once, and it mitigates the risks posed by a ring 
of bad recommenders. 
In Section 2, we discussed the risks inherent in using 
trust models that are solely based on reputation for IoT, 
such as [19], [23], [24]. Our model utilises both objective 
and subjective trust parameters in computing trust values 
for nodes. The trustor also decides the relative importance 
of each parameter. Hence, rather than having to use two 
different trust models in an IoT application context where 
both QoS and social trust must be considered, our trust 
model ensures we can compute one aggregate trust value 
in such contexts. Our model also dynamically adapts to 
changes in the trust community similar to [14], [15]. Both 
models correctly identify that bad recommendations make 
it difficult to reach a new ground truth status quickly, as 
was also discussed in this paper. In those models however, 
two different model parameters must be tuned to achieve 
a high degree of trust resilience. The method with which 
we manage recommendations in our model ensures that 
we achieve a similar level of trust resilience without hav-
ing to continuously tune system parameters during inter-
actions. 
In most of the trust models we have cited, the reputation 
of a node providing a recommendation is the only factor 
that is taken into consideration in deciding the weight of 
that recommendation. In CTRUST, the recommendation 
function also considers how recently direct interactions 
were made between the trustor and the node on which a 
recommendation is being provided, and the difference be-
tween the past trust value and the recommendation value 
for that node. This makes recommendations more robust 
and effectively deters opportunistic service attacks. We 
also determined the point at which the trust between two 
nodes reaches maturity. When trust maturity is reached 
within a session, a node can reliably compute trust values 
based on direct assessments alone. This reduces both the 
processing and storage overhead involved in trust compu-
tation, which is vital in the IoT platform where low compu-
ting power is a major characteristic. 
It should be noted that while the importance of trust-
based security in IoT has been recognised, trust manage-
ment for IoT is still evolving. We believe that the work pre-
sented in this paper is a major contribution to this field, fills 
important research gaps, and will provide a better well-
rounded approach to trust modelling in IoT. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we enumerated the suitable properties for a 
trust management system for collaborative IoT applica-
tions. We then designed CTRUST in accordance with these 
properties. We have modelled trust as a result-oriented 
metric evaluated on parameters that are mapped to the 
functional requirements in the applied context. The model 
was evaluated in a collaborative download context. The 
analysis shows that the model is effective, and its trust es-
timation and performance show a high degree of accuracy, 
reliability and resilience. The model is adaptable to several 
collaborative contexts. CTRUST effectively addresses self-
promotion, good-mouthing, ballot-stuffing, opportunistic 
service and on-off attacks. It requires little computing and 
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energy resources for trust computation. 
CTRUST is flexible since several design parameters can 
be set up based on the applied context. We implemented a 
robust trust decay function and mathematically modelled 
the acceptance of recommendations based on insights from 
social interactions. We were also able to determine the 
number of direct interactions required to achieve trust ma-
turity between any two nodes. From the literature available 
to us, we conclude these are novel and important contribu-
tions to the study of trust management in IoT. 
In normalising values on each parameter, we have used 
a linear value function. However, sometimes the utility 
function of the initiator is marginally not linear. Collabora-
tive applications generally address service provision and 
service composition. To model trust more accurately in 
these applications, we shall consider defining a utility 
function and threshold scales for each parameter in future 
work. We will consider how to set parameter weights dy-
namically and automatically, in response to changes in the 
collaboration community. We will also evaluate our trust 
model within other collaborative contexts in IoT. 
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